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TO WALK A CROOKED PATH: SEPARATING LAW AND
RELIGION IN THE SECULAR STATE
DIANE LEENHEER ZIMMERMAN*

Uncertainty about the proper sphere of influence for religious
belief in a democratic society has prompted debate on at least two
levels. On the first level-that of general political theory-the exploration is part of a broader attempt to define the ideal nature of
democratic society and to understand, within that structure, how
government ought to be both empowered and restrained. A second,
more particularized, level of debate concerns the correct interplay
between religion and the exercise of government power within the
United States. On this level, the choices are significantly constrained by the text of the first amendment of the Constitution,
which commands government to avoid both the establishment of
religion and interference with its free exercise. The issue is how to
comply with that command. To what extent, if any, can positive
law take account of views grounded in religion without falling afoul
of these constitutional limitations? Although Professor Greenawalt
gears his provocative arguments toward the more general level of
political theory, his claim that religious belief may be a proper
foundation for the exercise of legislative power has direct and
profound implications for an understanding of the constitutional
problem. This Comment will attempt, at least in part, to explore
these implications.
A clear understanding of the intended relation between church
and state in the United States is difficult to achieve because, both
philosophically and historically, attitudes concerning this issue
have been profoundly ambiguous. On the one hand, Americans, although not dominated by any particular form of organized religion,
have viewed their democratic traditions as intimately related to
their general religious traditions. A nation with a strong, predominantly Christian religious coloration understandably has
* Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., 1963, Beaver College; J.D., 1976, Columbia University.
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anticipated that law ought to be conducive to the religious experience and expression of its citizenry.' At the same time, a second
powerful conviction exists that, pursuant to constitutional command, government should be secular.2 It should favor neither particular religions nor irreligion; rather, it should operate independent of the particular belief systems within society. Not
surprisingly, the attempt to accomplish this complex task has required courts, scholars, and legislators to tread a rather crooked
and uncertain path.
Nowhere has the tension between these inconsistent goals been
more acute than when the claim is made that legislation is invalid
because it has been influenced improperly by the values of particular creeds.' The problem is a large one. In a society in which religion has exerted a powerful influence, many criminal laws, as well
as many laws governing family relations or touching on other
moral concerns, are congruent with and often derived from the insights of the Judeo-Christian faiths.
No satisfactory scholarly or judicial consensus has emerged to
help resolve doubts about the propriety of this influence. The response of the courts to this question has been little short of idiosyncratic..They seem to assume simultaneously that positive law
must be independent of sectarian concerns and that it can reflect
sectarian concerns, as long as it does not track them too closely.
This is not an intelligible standard. Under the Supreme Court's
current tripartite test for an establishment clause violation, the
first inquiry is whether the relevant legislation or regulation has a
"secular" purpose.4 Under this test, the Court has struck down cer-

1. Alexis de Tocqueville commented extensively on the influence of shared religious traditions on American democracy in the nineteenth century. A.
AMERICA

DE TOCQUEVILLE,

DEMOCRACY

IN

287-301 (J. Mayer ed. 1969).

2. For some early examples of manifestations of belief in secular government, see L. PFEFFsR, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 14 (1975).
3. Although the distinction in some sense may be unduly artificial, I mean to distinguish
these cases from cases, such as those involving aid to parochial schools, that involve the
granting of benefits to religious organizations.
4. The tripartite test is set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The
second prong of the Lemon test is that the law must not have a primary or principal effect
of advancing religion. The third holds that the law, to be valid, cannot involve the state in
"excessive entanglement" with religion. Id.
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tain enactments that too closely track religious practices or dogmas. Sometimes the Court has relied on specific evidence of a
religious purpose in the legislative history-evidence, for example,
in the Alabama "moment of silence" case of an intent to promote
prayer in public schools.5 In other cases, the Court has invalidated
laws under the secular purpose test when the only asserted purpose of the legislation was secular,6 or when the intent was ambiguous because secular and religious influences had become intertwined. The outcomes, however, usually have not been well
explained, creating a suspicion that the Court is proceeding more
on instinct than on articulable grounds. Because what constitutes
an adequate "secular purpose" is not defined clearly, the so-called
"test" creates no methodology for distinguishing between permissible secular and impermissible sectarian laws. The test is merely
conclusory.
Two well-known Supreme Court establishment opinions illustrate this lack of clear analytical structure. These decisions involved legislation supported by a mixture of sectarian and nonsectarian purposes. The first concerned the validity of Sunday closing
laws, the second the teaching of evolution in the public schools.
In McGowan v. Maryland,7 the Supreme Court acknowledged
both that Sunday closing laws originated as an enforcement of religious beliefs8 and that they were retained in deference to the preferences of the Christian majority.9 But the Court carefully avoided
finding that such laws constitute an impermissible establishment
by concluding that their religious aspects were not pertinent. The

5. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (per curiam) (finding that, although the sole stated legislative purpose in requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in
school rooms was that it was the basis for legal codes in Western civilization and in the
United States, the law's actual purpose was to introduce a religious text into the classroom).
7. 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961).
8. Id. at 431-33.
9. Id. at 433-35. Chief Justice Warren further argued in his majority opinion that the fact
that the chosen day of rest is "a day of particular significance for the dominant Christian
sects, does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals." Id. at 444-45. He added that
requiring states to choose a day other than Sunday merely because Sunday also is a day of
religious observance "would give a constitutional interpretation of hostility rather than one
of mere separation of church and State." Id. at 445.
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legally relevant-and impeccably secular-motive, according to the
Court, was the state's desire to establish one uniform day of rest. 10
1 the Court struck down
By contrast, in Epperson v. Arkansas,"
as religiously motivated a state law barring the teaching of evolution from the public school curriculum, despite the availability of
nonreligious reasons to justify the statute. Many voters who supported the initiative in which the statute was passed undoubtedly
were motivated by religious beliefs. 12 As the court below pointed
out, however, states have broad authority to dictate the curriculum
of public schools.1 3 No school system must teach everything; selection of subjects for the curriculum is an ordinary governmental
function, and seldom does a school system have only one potential
justification for preferring one subject over another.' 4 Some Arkansas voters may have concluded that evolution was relatively unimportant compared to other subjects, while others might have decided that the school system should avoid the subject solely on the
ground that it was highly controversial, and hence inappropriate
for a public school curriculum. Nevertheless, in the Court's view
this law remained impermissibly sectarian.
Whatever one's view of the propriety of these opposing outcomes, logically credible arguments can be made, based on existing
precedent, for finding establishments in both cases, for finding establishments in neither, or for reversing the outcome of both deci-

10. Id. at 450.
11. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). For a more recent lower court decision concerning a statute providing that if evolution is taught, creation science must be taught as well, see Aguillard v.
Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (1986), in which
the court rejected the argument that the "balanced treatment" statute protected academic

freedom.
12. 393 U.S. at 108-09 & nn.16-17.
13. Arkansas v. Epperson, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967) (finding that Arkansas law
banning the teaching of evolution was a "valid exercise" of the state's power to specify the
curriculum of its public schools), rev'd, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
14. The Court addressed a somewhat similar controversy, this time arising under the free
speech clause of the first amendment, in Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion). In that case, the justices splintered badly trying to decide whether the Constitution imposes limitations on the broad discretion of school boards to remove books from
school libraries. The dissenters argued for broad discretion in establishing curriculum and in
choosing materials and teachers for the school system. The plurality did not reject the arguments for broad discretion, arguing instead that the elimination of books already purchased
by the schools was subject to constitutional review.
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sions. In short, we have yet to devise a coherent way to think about
the problem of religious purpose in legislation.
One need not look far for the roots of this analytical impasse.

Because religious perspectives inform so much law in American society, an approach that invalidates as an establishment any law
with religious origins would lead to absurd results. Civil liberties
for racial and other minorities received strong support from church
groups, both in this century and the last, because the concept of
human equality was a tenet of those groups' religious faith. Laws
against murder also have partially religious origins; Jews and
Christians hold that unjustified killing violates the laws of God expressed in the Ten Commandments.
One way out, of course, would be a rule that presumes a law to
be legitimate whenever both secular and sectarian justifications
can be articulated. The disadvantage of such a policy of deference,
however, is that it could erode all but the mere semblance of separation of church and state. Even the most transparently sectarian
laws could be enacted so long as they were insulated by the addition of some religiously neutral purpose. Because "neutral"
grounds are exceedingly easy to improvise, this approach would
force courts to abdicate altogether their supervisory role in this
sensitive area, and is not an attractive solution. Caught in this perceived dilemma, courts have been unable to chart a clear middle
course. Consequently, the Court's reasoning in cases in the area
remains distinctly ad hoc.
One effect of this analytical cul-de-sac has been to limit establishment analysis to comparatively few religious disputes and to
disable it as a vehicle for resolving the more pervasive and complex
conflicts that Professor Greenawalt's paper implicates. The most
troubling church-state problems are posed by laws embodying visions of moral good that, although widely shared and timehonored, originated in religious beliefs and that are hard to validate on purely rational grounds. The claim of such cases to be
viewed as religious conflicts normally either is ignored or affirmatively rebuffed. The Supreme Court, for example, summarily
thrust aside an attempt to raise the establishment issue in an abortion case on the ground that a law restricting federal funding of
abortions is "as much a reflection of 'traditionalist' values.., as it
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is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion."1 5 While
this undoubtedly is true, it also begs the fundamental question. Is
there a point at which the influence of religion, even if it is mixed
in with secular "tradition," violates the principle behind the establishment clause? And if so, how is that point to be identified? The
issue is further complicated because tradition in the area of moral
values often develops out of religious belief, and the two are difficult to distinguish conceptually.
The absence of an adequate establishment clause analysis, of
course, has not prevented society from addressing the problems
caused by religiously influenced laws. Many states have modified
or repealed laws restricting divorce or prohibiting certain sexual
acts because both the traditional and the religious consensus supporting them has weakened. The Supreme Court also has played
an important role in eliminating some types of laws with strong
sectarian underpinnings. In so doing, however, the Court often has
relied on new and evolving constitutional doctrines that are in
their own way as problematic as a more vigorous establishment
analysis might be. Restrictions on abortion in the early stages of
pregnancy and on the availability of contraceptives were found to
infringe a right of privacy that the Court derived from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.16 The Court struck down laws disfavoring
children born outside of wedlock by creating a new level of equal
protection analysis, midway between the two traditional tiers of
deferential rational basis scrutiny and the strict scrutiny reserved
for suspect classifications such as race.17 Arguably, the Court
reached out because these laws had important negative effects on
individual freedom and these effects were not readily defensible by
reference to an objective moral standard. In each case, the laws
reflected traditional values, but values closely interwoven with religious, largely Christian, ideology. 8 As such, their claim to acceptance by non-Christians or by non-traditional Christians was weak.

15. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980).
16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965) (contraceptives).
17. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
18. For a discussion of the religious origins of laws dealing with illegitimacy, see L. PFEFFER, supra note 2, at 115-24.
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This alternate route to resolution does not substitute for an adequate definition of which intertwinings of God and Caesar are
"establishments." One problem is that not all cases fit neatly into
other available categories for purposes of constitutional analysis.
Another problem is that an alternative analysis presupposes recognition of injustice, often in areas in which judges may be least
prone to acknowledge it because of the religious influences in their
own cultural backgrounds. A jurist's or legislator's individual reactions to homosexuality may influence powerfully whether that individual believes that restrictions against private homosexual acts
between consenting adults-laws that receive substantial support
from Judeo-Christian tradition-offend constitutional protections
for privacy to the same degree as laws banning access to contraceptives. 19 For example, laws against obscenity, which also rest heavily
on religious grounds, 20 may remain so obdurant to attack in part
because a majority of the Supreme Court does not empathize with
would-be consumers.21 If, however, a principled standard were
available to identify whether these laws are so infected with religious belief as to be establishments, courts could decide their validity with less reliance on variable value judgments. The issue
would not turn as much on the "acceptability" of homosexuality or
of sexually explicit literature as on the legitimacy of the legislative
power exercised in these areas.
The appeal of the liberal political theory questioned by Professor Greenawalt was its promise as a new source of insights into the
development of a principled establishment analysis. This body of
theory generally agrees that exercises of political power in a liberal
democracy should be rationally explicable and defensible to every19. The Supreme Court recently upheld a Georgia sodomy statute barring private, consensual homosexual acts between adults in the face of a claim that the statute violated the
constitutional right of privacy. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986). The Court noted
that "[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots." Id. at 2844. In dissent, Justice Blackmun explicitly recognized the religious nature of those "ancient roots." Id. at
2854-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20. For an argument that obscenity laws are religious in nature, see Henkin, Morals and
the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963).
21. Some support for this suspicion can be found in Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court
in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). He wrote: "[Flew of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified
Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Id. at 70.
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one in that society. From this follows the conclusion that, because
no individual's private, nonrational insights are entitled to bind
others, particularized religious beliefs cannot be used to justify
law.22 Emerging from this line of reasoning are possible operative
principles for thinking through the otherwise unclear imperative of
the establishment clause. Under these principles, political decisions could reflect religious insights or traditions and remain valid,
but only if they could be justified convincingly on independent, objective grounds.
This approach would avoid the indiscriminate invalidation of all
laws supported in part for religious reasons. For example, people
with religious beliefs and those with none may share a common
secular ground for outlawing slavery or offering equality of opportunity and legal treatment without regard to race, gender, or
ethnicity. That religious individuals also may support these outcomes because they perceive them to flow from the commands of
God does not offend liberal democratic, or constitutional, principles, because the claim of such laws to acceptance in society does
not depend on those religious beliefs. On the other hand, laws restricting obscenity, which are difficult to support on rational
grounds, might well be found to violate the establishment clause.
I do not pretend to offer the precise design of such an analysis,
or to have answers to such difficult questions as how to define
clearly what is rational or what is religious. Not every question
posed under the rubric of religious motive may be addressed readily by this analysis.23 In other cases in which the approach is applicable, the results may be too controversial as a political matter for
22. A representative statement of these theoreticians' point of view can be found in the
writings of L.W. Sumner:
In a free society [religious] groups are entitled to enforce their belief among
their members, as long as membership itself is genuinely voluntary. But they
are not entitled to enforce their belief among those who dissent from it. The
enforcement by public law of the moral creed of some religious sect is out of
place in a pluralistic and secular state.
L. SUMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 17 (1981). Many of these theorists would argue
that any nonrational moral or ethical belief would be similarly disabled as a source of authority for legislation, without regard to whether it was "religious" in origin. See, e.g., D.
LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 191 (1984).
23. I am uncertain, for example, whether the liberal political theory under discussion
would resolve the religious motive questions posed by Epperson and McGowan. See supra
notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
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ready adoption.2 4 My strong sense, however, is that without some
firm limit of this general sort on the influence of religion on political decisionmaking, a meaningful vision of the secular state could
be difficult to preserve.
Not surprisingly, therefore, I am uneasy with the implications of
the contrary position so compellingly set out by Professor Greenawalt. He argues that people in a democratic society must decide at
least some moral questions for which rational bases are unavailable
for example, what degree of protection to give to animals or to
the environment. Because a rational resolution cannot be found,
according to Professor Greenawalt, citizens have no choice but to
rely instead on nonrational beliefs and preferences, and their doing
so offends no democratic principle. He then goes on to assert that,
if nonrational beliefs must be relied upon, no valid reason exists to
exclude reliance on those nonrational beliefs that happen to be
religious.
Insofar as they relate to decisionmaking by individual members
of a democratic state, I find Professor Greenawalt's arguments persuasive. My difficulties arise from the next step in his analysis. Although he does not develop this theme in detail, I understand him
to assert that individual moral choices, although founded on sectarian grounds, may be translated into positive law without violating
the first amendment of the Constitution.
Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with either the
structure or conclusions of Professor Greenawalt's arguments, in
my view he makes several important points. First, he demonstrates
that assumptions about the availability of rational grounds on
which political decisions can be based may have been overly optimistic or in need of further defense. Second, he reminds us that,
even as to questions that are amenable to reasoned answers, reliance on purely rational grounds may be impossible to achieve. The
mental processes of the human mind are not like discrete, overlapping sheets of mica. One's nonrational belief systems may profoundly influence what one accepts as "rational" in the arena of
moral choice and may indeed not be fully segregable.
Having said that, I fear my overall response to his thesis is to
doubt whether some types of protection for animals and the envi24. See, e.g., infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
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ronment legitimately can be legislated, absent a rational basis,
rather than to be convinced that legislation based on religious beliefs in fact may be valid. Let me try to articulate the reasons for
my discomfort by shifting the ground somewhat from that taken
by Professor Greenawalt.
In my opinion, Professor Greenawalt's arguments may be
colored by the perspective from which he approaches the analysis.
He looks at the question entirely from the point of view of the
individual believer who must decide a public moral question, and
asks what one can fairly expect of religious citizens if one accepts
the premises that underlie our political institutions.2 5 At a number
of points, he emphasizes, quite correctly, that the demand that political debate be limited to rational or at least nonreligious nonrational grounds exacts a toll on the integrity of the religious believer's personality. 26 Perhaps because he focuses on the claims of
believers to bring their religious insights to bear on political
choices, he does not, in my view, sufficiently consider the toll his
analysis would exact from those who do not share the same
insights.
He acknowledges, but does not discuss, the possible injustice of
binding others by religiously-grounded moral choices, apparently
because of his judgment that religious traditions are widely shared
in this country and that, historically, they have not been an important source of division and hostility.2 7 Given this starting position,
one might conclude that allowing religious beliefs a role in political
debate is consistent with the intent of the Constitution. Allowing
religious beliefs such a role maximizes religious freedom and respects individual autonomy and conscience. Because I am not convinced that this notion of religious freedom is complete and am
less confident than Professor Greenawalt about the issue of serious
religious divisiveness, I would argue that religious freedom may be
better served in the long run by denying it political effect.
Ordinarily, the laws governing a democracy reflect the viewpoints of the majority but are not seen as working some inherent
25. Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Pro-

tecting Animals and the Environment 27, WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1040-47 (1986).
26. Id. at 1046-47, 1061.
27. Id. at 1064.
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unfairness on the minority. In a few areas, however, our political
assumptions are structured differently. Certain protections for individual rights, including the right to freedom of religious belief,
require a limitation on the majoritarian principle. If nonrational
religious beliefs can support public moral choice consistent with
the Constitution, I am not sure how, if at all, the results can be
squared with this notion of limitation. What account is to be made
of dissenters?
Let us take the example of sexual behavior. Like others, 28 I do
not believe that an argument can be made on rational grounds for
preferring as morally correct any particular arrangement of sexual
relations between or among consenting adults. Different societies,
and even the same society at different times in its history, have
approved of a wide variety of possibilities. Because systems could
be devised to deal with such matters as care of children or division
of property, regardless of which forms of sexual union are permitted, the claim of any one form is difficult to validate objectively.
Viewed in this light, polyandry, polygamy, and unrestricted individual choice seem equally entitled to primacy as moral preferences. In the United States, however, monogamous heterosexual
union accompanied by formal marriage has been the legal norm.
Because the law intended the marital union to be permanent, divorce in most states was difficult to obtain until recently. Alternatives to monogamous marriage-fornication, adultery, homosexual
relations, and bigamy-were proscribed by criminal law. A strong
case could be made that the moral beliefs of Christianity profoundly influenced this choice of family form, and the proscription
29
of alternatives.

28. See, e.g., H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (generally criticizing legal enforcement of morals, but focusing in particular on sexual morals, which Hart asserts are
largely a function of "variable tastes and conventions"); L. SUMNER, supra note 22, at 17;
Henkin, supra note 20, at 402-07; Hughes, Morals and the CriminalLaw, 71 YALE L.J. 662,
675-80, 682-83 (1961); cf. D. LYONS, supra note 22, at 17 (noting the enormous diversity from
culture to culture of "sexual and child-rearing practices, .. marital arrangements and kinship patterns").
29. Patrick Devlin, who supported the legislation of morality, recognized that "the whole
of our moral law is religious in origin and we talk of the sort of marriage which is recognized
in [Great Britain] as 'Christian marriage.'" P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 62
(1965). He went on at length to argue that Christian marriage is acceptable as the ideal to
"the right-thinking man in western society." Id. at 63.
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For the sake of argument, assume that laws limiting sexual relations to monogamous marriage unquestionably rest substantially
on nonrational religious grounds. If I understand Professor Greenawalt correctly, his theory, on both theoretical and constitutional
grounds, would permit lawmakers to bring religious beliefs to bear
on a question of public importance when rational grounds for decision are unavailable. In this example, however, would the resulting
injury to those who reject the operative religious insights be sufficiently important that it too should be taken into account in thinking about the legitimate sources of law? The answer to this question should be yes, even if the entire society publicly acquiesced in
the values supporting monogamous marriage, as Americans seem
to have done for generations. In a society dominated economically,
socially, and politically by one or more religious groups that accept
monogamy as religiously ordained, this belief could powerfully influence those both in and out of the dominant group. Some might
assent because they accepted the dominant tradition as a personally satisfactory source of norms; for others, assent would result
from spiritual conviction about the ultimate rightness of the norm.
Others, however, would accede to the coercive effect of the norm
simply because dissent-even purely intellectual dissent-would
be too costly to risk.
Religious norms, in a religious society, have special power. Even
today, when legal affirmance of permanent monogamous marriage
has been eroded seriously, individuals still express concern that divorce would be damaging to their careers or social standing. I am
compelled by the argument of political theorists that religious freedom includes a right not to be forced to accept others' beliefs, and
I believe that injury in a constitutional sense may result if that
right is not preserved. If a minority group voices significant disagreement, without having any effect on the law to which it objects,
open strife along religious lines is a real possibility. The example of
the struggle between Mormons and the federal and state governments during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries bears this
30

out.

30. See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); In re State in Interest of Black, 3
Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955).
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One could respond to this dilemma by saying that the proper
interests of dissenters are protected fully by the other half of the
religion clauses: the right to free exercise. If this were so, then constitutional objections to Professor Greenawalt's analysis would lose
much of their force. This argument founders, however, on the realities of current free exercise jurisprudence. Courts decide these
cases using a complex system of balancing of interests. One element in the balance seems to be the court's assessment of the
moral validity of the free exercise claim itself. In Reynolds v.
United States,3 1 one reason the Supreme Court rejected the
claimed right of Mormons to practice polygamy was the moral dis32
taste the justices felt for the practice.
Another element that may affect the balance is the sheer number of potential claimants. If too many people claim exemptions
from a law, the state may be unreasonably burdened by the administrative problems of operating a dual system.3 3 In addition, the
state may be unable to achieve the purposes for which the statute
was passed. For instance, the Court dismissed the free exercise
claims of Sabbatarians protesting Sunday closing laws on the
ground that exempting so many people would defeat the statutory
intent to establish a uniform day of rest. 4 More fundamentally,
however, numerous exceptions to a statute undercut the very concept of law as uniform and systematically operating rules. The
Court complained in Reynolds that recognition of a free exercise
claim like the one for polygamy would allow "every citizen to become a law unto himself," and would permit "Government [to] ex-

31. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
32. Id. at 164-66. Cases in which claimants argue that they should be allowed to use proscribed drugs in their religious worship also may raise this issue. See, e.g., Leary v. United
States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1968); State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926).
33. In argument before the Supreme Court on a free exercise claim in a recent case, the
effect of the numbers of potential claimants on the Government's administrative burden was
discussed fully in colloquy between the justices and counsel. Summary of Oral Argument,
Bowen v. Roy, 54 U.S.L.W. 3515, 3516 (U.S. Feb. 11, 1986). Ultimately, the Court concluded
that even if only a small number of welfare recipients were to claim exemptions, on religious
grounds, from the requirement to obtain and use social security numbers for identification,
the risk of a few fraudulent claims was one the government was not required to bear. The
Court, therefore, rejected the free exercise claim. Owen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2157-58
(1986).
34. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961).
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ist only in name. '3 5 This was not a frivolous argument. As a result,
free exercise claims are most easily sustained by small groups of
individuals whose behavior is not too noticeably deviant. Thus,
comprehensive protection for the beliefs of significant, dissenting
majorities under the free exercise clause is doubtful.
This argument also fails because the free exercise clause as currently understood is too limited conceptually to protect religious
freedom fully. Free exercise claims ordinarily are thought to arise
when positive laws conflict with religiously mandated beliefs or
conduct. Many dissenters from laws that rely on religiously based
consensus are unable to show that their affirmative religious beliefs
require them to behave in a nonlegal way. Nevertheless, their freedom of conscience or spirituality may be infringed because they
are compelled to obey the dictates of a religious belief system that
they reject. A concrete example of the problem appears in Harris
v. McRae,3 6 a case involving a challenge to restrictions on federal
funding of abortions. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiffs' free exercise claim because the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate that their religious beliefs required them to have
abortions.3 7 Because religious freedom inheres not solely in the
right to practice a particular faith, but also in the right to reject
particular beliefs or religion altogether, the free exercise
clause-without major reinterpretation-does not strike a fair
balance.
On the whole, then, I remain skeptical that a pluralistic society
can achieve maximum freedom of religious belief unless it accepts
significant restrictions on the political role of faith. Perhaps, as he
develops his thesis in later work addressed more specifically to the
fit between his argument and the religion clauses, Professor Greenawalt will suggest ways to meet these concerns. Perhaps he will
demonstrate that my disagreement is in some way premised on an
incorrect understanding of religious freedom. Meanwhile, having
had the premises shaken hard beneath me, I still will veer toward
the position that law should be supported by neutral, rational
grounds and that the political role of religion should be limited to

35. 98 U.S. at 167.
36. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
37. Id. at 320.
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confirming, rather than to supplementing, the dictates of reason. A
society that refuses to tell individuals how to regulate their personal sexuality does not infringe these individuals' freedom to regulate sexuality for themselves, based on their religious beliefs or on
other sources of values. Nor does it prevent them, if they can, from
trying to persuade others to adopt their vision of right behavior
and ultimate good. A society, however, that allows legislators to
embody nonrational choices in positive law, particularly choices
based on religious belief, creates the possibility that only those
whose voices count in the consensus will enjoy freedom of conscience and belief.

